Nuclear Plant Journal, May-June 2015 NuclearPlantJournal.com
31
Jeremy Bowen:
For the orders, the
deadline was two refueling cycles after
the orders were issued. The reason for that
staggered schedule was recognition that
it takes time for licensees to go through
and design these strategies, identify what
modifications need to be made, and then
determine what modifications can’t be
made while the plant is online. There can
potentially be a larger safety concern if
the plant were to shut down unnecessarily
to try and make a modification. There
was the recognition to allow the plant
to continue with a normal process of
methodically planning out and taking the
appropriate time to do this correctly and
safely.
The first units were expected to
come into compliance with the mitigating
strategies order in fall 2014, and about
half a dozen did. In spring 2015 there’s
another large group that’s around a dozen
or so. And then there’s another group in
the fall 2015, spring 2016 and fall 2016.
So, all the plants are on schedule and on
track for their established schedules.
The agency is actually going out
and doing evaluations before the plants
come into compliance. We’re looking
at the progress the plants are making
and determining that the utilities are on
a successful path to compliance with the
order. Same thing with regard to the spent
fuel instrumentation order. That’s also on
a staggered schedule. There are plants
that are installing those instruments,
several that installed in the fall 2014,
some are installing in the spring 2015.
Same thing with the severe accident
capable hardened vent order.
And then for the 50.54(f) letter,
request for information, licensees are all
submitting the information by the due
date that was assigned, or in a couple
instances, there were cases where the
plants needed additional support from
other entities. For example the Army
Corps of Engineers is doing evaluations
of some of the dams. You’re providing
that information to the licensees so that
the licensees can factor that into their
assessment, and then they’re sending
that information in. In some of those
cases, plants needed a bit more time,
based on the schedule that the Army
Corps of Engineers is working on, but
everyone, all the licensees, are on track.
Collectively the industry and the agency
are on track to see the vast majority of
the safety enhancements installed by the
end of 2016.
6.
Do the utilities have an adjunct
group like, their owners group or some
other institutions that they can reach out
for help?
Jack Davis:
On the agency side, we
have a Fukushima steering committee.
It’s headed up by the Deputy Executive
Director of Operations, Mike Johnson.
And we have office directors that sit
on that panel as well. Industry has an
equivalent executive steering committee
as well on their side for Fukushima. It’s
mostly comprised of their chief nuclear
officers. So, both of those groups get
together about every two months and have
a joint steering committee meeting. It’s a
public meeting where the public can view
both sides coming together to talk about
making sure that there’s alignment and
that there’s consistency in the approach,
and that progress is being made is one of
the other very important things that we
cover in those meetings. So, those are
regular meetings that occur.
7.
Which US NRC division handles the
post-Fukushima modifications for the
new plants?
Jack Davis:
For the new plants,
the Office of New Reactors handles that
work. However, my organization, the
Japan Lessons-Learned Division, works
for the Deputy Executive Director of
Operations and also Bill Dean, Director of
the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
We have to make consistent decisions for
the agency across all these areas. So,
although NRO (Office of New Reactors)
handles their items for their new reactors,
when it comes to rulemaking and so on,
all that has to be consistent. My division
works in that regard for the Deputy
Executive Director of Operations to
ensure that consistency.
8.
Is tier 1, tier 2, and tier 3 still in
place?
Jack Davis:
That’s still in place.
Tier 1 activities were considered the most
safety-significant priority activities that
needed to be worked on first. And tier
2 and tier 3 obviously followed. These
were either lower priority activities,
or they required a skill set already
involved in priority one work, and so
these were scheduled for a later time.
The Commission then put out what the
schedules will be for tier 2 and tier 3.
We’re currently in the process of going
back and re-evaluating those schedules
to determine a proper closure, a proper
disposition, for tier 2 and tier 3 items.
With that said, there were several
items in tier 2 and tier 3 that were
actually accelerated and brought into
tier 1 because as the agency went along
and had more information, we realized
that well, it makes sense to take that
particular activity and combine it, for
instance, with mitigation strategies and
do it at the same time, because it just
made a lot more efficient sense. So,
several of the items, like the spent fuel
pool scoping study, was brought up from
tier 3 into tier 1.
9.
How does US NRC collaborate
internationally?
Jack Davis:
With regard to
Fukushima, we actually work extensively
with the international community.
In August 2014, Japan, China,
Canada, Russia, all presented their plans
for what they’re doing in the Fukushima
area, as well as we did. And we take
lessons learned from each other to ensure
that we’re getting the best bang for the
buck. Now, each country, because their
unique circumstances, is doing something
different . You’re implementing it slightly
differently, but we’re all consistent in
saying yes, we have to look at how we get
rid of decay heat from the core, how we
deal with emergency communications,
emergency preparedness type of
activities, how you deal with the spent
fuel pool and so on.
10.
Concluding remarks.
Jack Davis:
The agency got this one
right. We strategically figured out what
are the additional things that needed to be
done immediately, what are some of the
things that can be done long-term, and
we took a very reasonable approach to
getting real safety improvements at these
plants. This is probably the biggest safety
margin improvement since TMI, when
the industry came up with the simulators
and other modifications.
Contact: Scott Burnell, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, Office of Public
Affairs, Washington, DC 20555-0001;
