Page 50 - Nuclear Plant Journal Digital Edition: January - February 2013

50 NuclearPlantJournal.comNuclear Plant Journal, January-February 2013
High-Level...
Continued from page 32
Fukushima
Recommendations...
Continued from page 34
Recommendation 7:
Develop a system of independent
investigation commissions.
A system for appointing independent
investigation committees, including
experts largely from the private sector,
must be developed to deal with unresolved
issues, including, but not limited to, the
decommissioning process of reactors,
dealing with spent fuel issues, limiting
accident effects and decontamination.
Summary and Findings
Was the accident preventable?
The Commission has verified that
on March 11, 2011, the structure of the
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Plant was
not capable of withstanding the effects
of the earthquake and the tsunami. Nor
was the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Plant
prepared to respond to a severe accident.
In spite of the fact that TEPCO and the
regulators were aware of the risk from
such natural disasters, neither had taken
steps to put preventive measures in place.
It was this lack of preparation that led to
the severity of this accident.
Escalation of the accident
The Commission closely investigated
the development of the accident. We
studied whether the accident could have
been contained, and whether it could
have become even more serious. We also
examined the role of the earthquake as a
cause of the accident, and the validity of
TEPCO’s claim that the tsunami was the
sole direct cause.
Emergency response to the
accident
The Commission investigated
the accident response of TEPCO, the
regulatory agencies, the government and
the Kantei (Prime Minister’s office)—
including the early stages of the response,
the development of the accident, the
emergency response system and the crisis
management system.
Spread of the damage
The Commission made a number of
findings regarding the spread of damages
from the accident at the nuclear plant. We
studied how decisions were made, and
how the policies and defensive measures
were communicated to the public. We
also investigated these matters from the
perspective of the residents affected by
the accident damage.
Organizational issues in accident
prevention and response
The Commission found a number
of organizational issues regarding
preventive measures prior to the
accident, the causes of the accident and
the crisis management response after
the accident. We investigated the entire
chain of events in order to discover what
went wrong with the organizations and
systems involved. We also examined the
relationship between TEPCO and the
regulatory agencies with a view to reform
in the future.
The legal system
The Commission investigated the
need for the fundamental reform of
laws and regulations governing nuclear
power. It outlined the need to prepare an
organizational structure that would assure
sound decision-making processes for
the implementation of nuclear laws and
regulations.
Conclusion
In its Strategy, theAdministration has
highlighted agreement with many of the
principles of the BRC recommendations
and has outlined actions that, with
legislative authorization by Congress,
can lead to a safe and responsible
solution to managing the nation’s nuclear
waste. Indeed, action by Congress in the
form of new authorizing legislation and
appropriations is necessary for success
of the waste management mission.
Specifically, legislation is needed in
the near term to permit or address the
following activities over the next 10
years: Strategy for the Management and
Disposal of Used Nuclear Fuel and High-
Level Radioactive Waste.
Active engagement in a broad, •
national, consent-based process
to site pilot and full-scale interim
storage facilities, and site and
characterize a geologic repository;
Siting, design, licensing, and •
commencement of operations at
a pilot-scale storage facility with
an initial focus on accepting used
nuclear fuel from shut-down reactor
sites.;
Significant progress on siting and •
licensing of a larger consolidated
interim storage facility capable of
providing system flexibility and an
opportunity for more substantial
progress in reducing government
liabilities;
Development of transportation •
capabilities (personnel, processes,
equipment) to begin movement of
fuel from shut-down reactors;
Reformation of the funding approach •
in ways that preserve the necessary
role for ongoing discretionary
appropriations and also provide
additional funds as necessary,
whether from reclassified fees or
from mandatory appropriation from
the NWF or both; and
Establishment of a new organization •
to run the program, the structure
and positioning of which balance
greater autonomy with the need for
continued Executive and Legislative
branch oversight.
This Strategy translates the BRC’s
report and recommendations into a set
of broad steps that will ultimately benefit
the entire nation. The Administration
will work closely with the Congress to
develop a path forward that maximizes
the likelihood of success. When executed,
the new program will provide near-term
and long-term solutions for managing
the back-end of the nuclear fuel cycle,
thereby resolving a longtime source of
conflict in nuclear policy by providing
safe, secure, and permanent disposal.
Until the necessary new legislation has
been enacted, the Administration will
pursue components of the Strategy as
described above pursuant to current law
and in close coordination with Congress.
Finally, in executing the program the
federal government must work closely
with potential host states, tribes, and
communities whose engagement will
be essential for successfully operating
a comprehensive used nuclear fuel and
high-level radioactive waste storage,
transportation, and disposal system.