September-October 2018 NPJ
Nuclear Plant Journal, September-October 2018 NuclearPlantJournal.com 47 configurations thus eliminating potential injuries while testing security posture and strategy theories. More importantly, as we move forward and look for other applications, the first to come to mind is the use of simulation software and computer model usage to evaluate attack scenarios that pose a personnel safety or ALARA concern thereby avoiding the hazarding of personnel and/or equipment. Cost Savings The ARES/Avert model, in conjunction with the traditional data gathered through the Performance Evaluation Program as well as historical Force on Force, allowed the management team to confidently make the strategy change and the 10CFR 50.54(P) submittal decision that the reduction of 11 security posts, or 50 Full Time Employees presented no diminishment of effectiveness. This reduction of posts accounts for a monetary savings of approximately 7.1 million dollars annually and reflected in the formula below: 11 security posts $600,000/post = $6.6 million. 6 Oversight positions = $550,000. Productivity/Efficiency In addition to the monetary savings, the continued use of the ARES/Avert computer model and software has been and is an excellent tool that has provided Managers, Supervisors and Officers strategy experiences and challenges from a multi-faceted approach that one does not experience in the confines of a control cell or single BRE. Viewing and understanding the computer model/ software and the data derived from the multiple attack scenarios run against the site will continue to inform strategy decisions and responder training as this or any site strives to achieve security and FOF excellence. Salem-Hope Creek maintains and will continue to maintain a proactive stance regarding computer modeling and its acceptance through NEI working groups, open dialogue with the NRC and continued communication with the vendor to ensure software and data sets are properly updated and a robust peer- checking model and procedure are in place to govern usage. Transferability After sixteen years since 9/11, the threat to every utility is constant and changing and although the DBT has not changed, we are all required to constantly evaluate our defensive posture or strategy modifications. When tasked with identifying efficiencies or deficiencies within their defensive posture or strategy, stakeholders can effectively utilize computer modeling software just as we have done to obtain detailed vulnerability analysis information that, industry wide, has been absent from the decision making processes from the onset of the massive security changes made after September 11, 2001. The return on investment (ROI) of computer simulation or modeling software is easily realized when security projects can be tested theoretically in the !" #$ % &' () ***)' () +, - . /, - ,.- 012 ,/13014. ! "# * + * & . / -+-, 5 4/1 ,0 6(.() +$% $-$%0$( 7 $864, $ % & '( & )* ++ ,"-"., , /0!/1 ""%2% ,. ! ,"./! - % !/, %)*334&,/ &!"&, %2%5 *4 ! 5 2 ,5& %%, 6 , .- 0* + ' - 0* * ) .2 . 0 - * + , - * 3 $ 5 $ " .6, 0 /14314/1/1340, 9 .6, 0 /14314/1/1 :+1+ ,5 4/154 (( " 3 $ /* $ ; +(( ; +(( 5 6 3<,3 (= (> (= (> (,=%$& (,=%$& .'$ ? 0!) 6. !. 4) 1 ,* + 1* 2 ! / ' 1 ' 7383 .+ * + '* 3 ' . $ model before a shovel is placed in the ground or a hammer strikes a nail. The ROI for Salem-Hope Creek occurred within 18 months. One challenge faced by any site developing a computer model is the accuracy of the model. To alleviate this concern, sites should provide security and station SMEs to vendors to make the development process seamless. The level of detail of the computer model is an option every site must consider up front and should be accounted for during development. What level of detail will be required for buildings and structures on site; is a detailed structure or a simple exterior shell needed? Is the ability to travel through a building or access to rooftops or windows necessary? Will you locate adversary or target set equipment and have you established site specific barriers and breach times for all defensive elements in your model?The development of the Salem-Hope Creek computer model was a collaborative effort within the Security Department with critical support from Engineering and Operations and constant communication with the vendor to produce the final product. Contact: John Peacock, PSEG Nuclear, email: John.Peacock@pseg. com.
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