September-October 2018 NPJ

Computer Modeling’s Ability to Gain Efficiencies By John Peacock, PSEG Nuclear. John Peacock Since September 2010 John Peacock has worked for PSEG Nuclear as the Security Strategy Manager at Salem-Hope Creek Station. Prior to that he was a Trooper with the New Jersey State Police for more than twenty-five years, a first responder to the World Trade Center after the attacks on 09/11and spent 14 days policing New Orleans after the devastation of Hurricane Katrina. He holds a Master’s Degree in Human Resources Training & Development from Seton Hall University and is a graduate of the FBI National Academy. The Nuclear Energy Institute’s Top Innovative Practice Awards highlight the nuclear industry’s most innovative techniques and ideas. This innovation won a 2018 Top Innovative Practice Award. The team members who participated included David Mannai, Senior Director Regulatory Operations; Trina Washington, Director of Security; John Peacock, Security Strategy Manager; Joel Edwards, Security Program Specialist, PSEG Nuclear. Summary The security demands at every commercial nuclear facility substantially increased after the horrific attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001 and those demands have continued to creep upward in the 16 years since. In order to meet these demands, sites throughout the industry have made security upgrades to ensure that the design and layout of their facilities can withstand a deliberate attack and that security staffing levels and preparedness training are both effective and efficient in meeting any potential challenge that may arise. Vehicle Barrier Systems (VBS), ro- bust Protected Area (PA) boundaries and delays within the PA have all been either created or added to in order to ensure that access to these facilities is con- trolled. Bullet Re- sistant Enclosures (BREs) have been erected and staffed with trained and highly qualified se- curity personnel. Security vehicle pa- trols and additional armed security per- sonnel ensure the site can meet both regulatory and de- fensive strategy requirements while pos- sessing the knowledge, skills, and abili- ties to thwart a potential attack against a nuclear facility. These security force members coupled with substantial physical security barriers provide the defense in depth necessary to deter, detect, interdict or neutralize the design basis threat (DBT) adversary, protect against radiological sabotage, and prevent the theft or diversion of special nuclear material. But the real questions remain:  How does a site know that they have been effective and efficient in the development of their site’s security posture and defensive strategy?  What tools were used to analyze placement of barriers, BREs, or security force members?  How do sites ensure that changes in the field (i.e. outage equipment, new building construction, etc.) and future strategic changes do not have unanticipated negative consequences to the security posture and defensive strategy? Since September 1, 2001, at Salem- Hope Creek and throughout the nuclear industry, the Performance Evaluation Program (PEP) has been the measuring tool by which many of these questions have been answered. The PEP, which consists of table top drills, annual Force on Force (FOF) exercises and limited scope or small scale FOF drills and exercises, along with triennial force on force exercises has thus far proven to be a sound but costly tool in the evaluation and analysis of a site’s defensive strategy. Although multifaceted, the PEP has its limitations as well as challenges in efficiently delivering the volume of data necessary to make informed decisions in the placement of defensive barriers to obtain a desired result and/or determining adequate staffing levels to meet the regulatory requirement of High Assurance and Defense in Depth. At Salem-Hope Creek, these challenges have been met and data limitations overcome through the development of a three dimensional computer model of the site, its barriers, and the security systems in place as well as the Security staff, staffing numbers and their armaments. Coupled with this model is an interactive simulation software program that allows the user to develop simulated attack scenarios to test the site’s defensive posture against the user defined statistical data embedded in the software. In the case of Salem-Hope Creek, the ARES/Avert software and model was chosen and implemented and in conjunction with the PEP to assist the security management team in data- informed defensive strategymodifications and decision making. Where previously, the only information provided in the decision making process were the results and analysis of table top drills, limited scope drills, and annual FOF exercises included in the PEP or the evaluations of Subject Matter Experts (SME) and (Continued on page 46) Nuclear Plant Journal, September-October 2018 NuclearPlantJournal.com 45