May-June 2019 NPJ

Nuclear Plant Journal, May-June 2019 NuclearPlantJournal.com 35 static; adjustments are routinely made to inspection focus areas, inspection samples, and inspection procedures. When problems do emerge, we need to clearly define and address them. But in a program that is generally working well, it will usually make sense to address specific, well-analyzed challenges through targeted refinements rather than sweeping transformations. Let me give you a few examples of potential Reactor Oversight Process changes that raise concerns for me. One proposal is for NRC to conduct fewer baseline inspections for plants that are performing well. Since the very beginning of the Reactor Oversight Process, the basic premise of baseline inspections has been that these are the minimum inspections that should be performed for every plant in the country, regardless of performance. So this would be a huge change. I worry that, if we went down this road, we would see more cyclical, up and down performance from plants. We know that performance doesn’t improve with less oversight. It declines. That’s why NRC performs oversight in the first place. I strongly believe that we should not do less than the minimum on inspections. Another set of proposals focuses on minimizing the importance of white findings. Some argue that only a yellow or red finding should result in a column change in the action matrix and an increase in NRC oversight. They also say that white findings should be quickly closed so that they don’t accumulate and that follow-up NRC inspections should be optional rather than automatic. I’m not sure what problem all of these changes are supposed to be solving. But major changes like these could have significant unintended consequences. One of the basic premises of the Reactor Oversight Process is that green and white findings can be leading indicators of larger, more safety significant problems. Pilgrim is a textbook example of that. Pilgrim was in Column 4 from September 2015 until earlier this month. And it got there from three white findings. It didn’t have any yellow or red findings. But the white findings caused NRC to take a closer look at performance at Pilgrim, and when we looked more closely, our inspectors found major problems. If the changes being discussed today had been made four years ago, Pilgrim wouldn’t have even moved to Column 2, let alone Column 4. That clearly would have been the wrong safety outcome. And it highlights the risks of discounting the importance of white findings. I want to mention one more proposed change to the Reactor Oversight Process. Currently, NRC maintains its own independent models – referred to as SPAR models – to evaluate the risk significance of findings at plants. These are separate from the licensees’ probabilistic risk assessments. Some stakeholders are arguing that NRC should discontinue its SPAR models and rely on the licensees’ PRAs. I think this would be a mistake. The SPAR models are vital tools that enable independent decision-making by the regulator. Not every licensee PRA would meet NRC’s needs, and agency reliance on the PRAs would require NRC to play a much greater role in the development and maintenance of those models. As risk information is used more and more by NRC and licensees, risk models become increasingly critical. NRC experts need a set of models that they know inside and out, that they can modify to meet their specific regulatory needs, and that can provide analytical defense-in-depth in case there are flaws in licensee PRAs. NRC’s SPAR models have served these important purposes well over the years. I don’t see the need for a big change to the SPAR models. As we think about areas where the agency has repeatedly struggled over the years and where significant changes may be warranted, I believe we should focus additional attention on two areas: the rulemaking process and the agency’s ability to quickly access and understand the licensing basis of each nuclear power plant. During my time on the Commission, I’ve seen several rulemakings that have taken a decade or longer to complete. I think everyone agrees that this is far too long, even for a complex rule. Rulemaking is an important regulatory tool, and we need to ensure that it is an effective tool at NRC. In some cases, we may use rulemaking to address a pressing safety or security problem. In other cases, a rule may be necessary to allow for greater technological innovation or new approaches to longstanding regulatory issues. We should not allow unnecessarily protracted rulemakings to become an obstacle to getting the right standards in place. In order to improve the timeliness of NRC rulemakings, I believe we should look at what processes, practices, and strategies have worked well at NRC and other federal regulatory agencies and which have not. For example, we should assess whether targeted rulemakings focused on one or two regulatory changes proceed more smoothly than broad rulemakings that make many, sometimes unrelated changes to a regulation. We should also assess whether all of the current steps in NRC’s rulemaking process are appropriate for every rule. NRC’s rulemaking process includes steps, such as the draft regulatory basis and regulatory basis, that other agencies’ rulemaking processes do not. For highly technical rules, these steps may add considerable value. For rules that are not technically complex, they may unnecessarily slow down the process. Based on an evaluation of the factors and practices that have been shown to contribute to timely, effective rulemakings (and those that have not), we could decide whether we should make any changes to the rulemaking process. To be a successful regulator, NRC also must be able to promptly access and understand the regulatory requirements applicable to each individual nuclear power plant. A solid understanding of each plant’s licensing basis is a prerequisite for effective oversight and enforcement. However, because these requirements are often contained in voluminous microfiche documents that are decades old, this foundational regulatory step is too often a challenge for the agency. Digitization of licensing basis documents is underway and may assist in quickly locating records of license requirements. And the staff is looking at whether the Task Interface Agreement process can be updated to provide more timely answers to questions from inspectors about the licensing basis of a plant. But I believe we should perform a holistic review of how to enhance the agency’s capabilities in this area. To do the best job for the American people, NRC needs to be open to new ideas and new approaches. But we also need to carefully and thoroughly evaluate proposed regulatory changes to ensure that they will have a positive impact on safety. That’s our core mission and must remain our top priority. Stakeholder feedback can help us to identify the ideas we should pursue -- and those we should not. So please stay engaged. Contact: NRC, telephone: (301 415- 5575.