Nuclear Plant Journal, September-October 2015 NuclearPlantJournal.com
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3.
Please describe “Risk Informed
Procurement” with examples.
The Code of Federal Regulations
(CFR) 10.CFR.50.69, “Risk-informed
categorization
and
treatment
of
structures, systems and components
for nuclear power reactors,” defines the
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s
(NRC) requirements for risk-informing
the categorization and treatment of
systems, structures and components
(SSCs) in nuclear power plants. The goal
of this voluntary regulation is to improve
overall plant safety by focusing attention
on those SSCs that are important to
safety, as determined by a risk-informed
process.
The industry’s approach to risk-
informed procurement encompasses the
categorization and treatment of SSCs
for nuclear power reactors, and blends
risk insights with the deterministic
categorization of safety-related and non-
safety-related SSCs. Safety-related SSCs
are divided into two risk-informed safety
categories (RISC): “safety significant”
(RISC-1) or “low safety significant”
(RISC-3). Similarly, RISC-2 and RISC-4
indicate the safety significance ranking of
non-safety-related SSCs in deterministic
classification. RISC-2 (non-safety-related
SSCs that perform safety-significant
functions) and RISC-3 (safety-related
SSCs that perform low safety-significant
functions) are both new risk-informed
categories.
In addition to the focus on safety,
another benefit for utilities is that low-
safety significant SSCs can be repaired
and replaced using alternative treatment
that has the potential to save more than
$1 million annually per reactor unit.
Thus, the regulation allows utilities and
the NRC to focus efforts on issues related
to high safety-significant SSCs, and to
reduce the regulatory burden and costs
associated with low safety-significant
equipment.
In a typical nuclear unit, there are
approximately 20,000 safety-related and
more than 50,000 non-safety related
SSCs. Based on the previous studies,
approximately 15,000 safety-related
SSCs fall into RISC-3 (75 percent),
which will allow reduction in the current
regulatory requirements. Less than
1,000 non-safety-related SSCs fall into
RISC-2 (2 percent), which may require
enhancement of the current maintenance
requirements.
Prior to 10.CFR.50.69, the NRC had
approved only one request for broadening
regulatory exemption to implement full-
scope, risk-informed graded quality
assurance programs for all plant systems.
This proof of concept has evolved into
10.CFR.50.69, which was approved for
Vogtle Units 1 and 2 in 2014. A general
approach and validity of the results for
Vogtle’s application were illustrated on
the following systems: chemical and
volume control, containment spray and
the radiation monitoring system. Since
this approach was approved in the NRC’s
safety evaluation report, Vogtle 1 and 2
can now apply this approach to any plant
system without any further approvals.
Re-categorization of SSCs is a
significant undertaking for utilities. To
begin incorporating 10.CFR 50.69, the
utility’s Probabilistic Risk Assessment
(PRA) must meet current PRA standards
and requirements.While post-Fukushima-
related work being driven by the NRC
is a priority, utilities may not have the
resources or expertise to take on a near-
first-of-a-kind application. However,
utilities understand that by implementing
10.CFR.50.69, reductions in repair and
replacement parts costs, equipment
qualification scope, maintenance rule
scope and test requirements translate to
bottom-line savings in operating costs.
4.
Has the AREVA Solutions Complex
participated in any of the post Fukushima
recovery operations?
The AREVA Solutions Complex
is designed to help utility clients and
equipment manufacturers meet the ever-
increasing requirements for safe nuclear
electricity production. It is one of the
most comprehensive and innovative
nuclear testing facilities in North
America. The seismic lab, environmental
chambers, machine shops, and various
metallurgical and chemistry laboratories
enable AREVA to develop, analyze and
validate nuclear plant equipment and their
performance under harsh conditions such
as earthquakes and high temperatures.
As a result of the recovery operations at
the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power
Plant, the industry introduced FLEX,
a major step in addressing events that
cause critical loss of power and reactor
cooling capabilities. FLEX provides
an additional layer of backup power
by positioning emergency equipment,
including generators, battery packs and
pumps, in multiple locations. AREVA’s
Solution Complex is providing many
services, including seismic capabilities, in
support of the utilities FLEX operations.
In addition to the work at the
Solutions Complex, AREVA sent nuclear
engineering experts to Japan in support
of the Fukushima recovery operations to
provide advice and consultation for the
long-term management of the event.
5.
Does AREVA have spare pumps,
which may be rushed to replace the
existing pumps, “on demand” at the
plants?
During original plant construction,
utilities typically purchased a spare
pump from the original equipment
manufacturer. Each plant has its own
unique flow and pressure requirements
that make these pumps custom tailored to
a specific reactor, and these pumps can be
installed on an emergent basis, if needed.
AREVA provides critical spare parts
for a number of these pumps and has
the ability to manufacture new parts as
part of a pump refurbishment campaign.
Utilities also have emergency access to
this equipment at the National SAFER
Response Centers, located in Memphis,
Tenn., and Phoenix, Arizona. The SAFER
Response Centers combine AREVA's
expertise in engineering, procurement,
project management and outage services
with the expertise of the Pooled Inventory
Management Program. This combined
expertise ensures emergency equipment
is available for immediate deployment
and implementation during emergent
events.
6.
How is the challenge of obsolescence
handled, when a safety-related pump
manufacturer is out of business?
There are several ways utilities have
overcome the obsolescence challenge.
One option has been to work with key
suppliers who have identical equipment
certified through an Appendix B quality
assurance program that is in stock and
available for purchase. The utilities can
purchase direct from these suppliers,
but they must take into consideration
