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Fukushima
Recommendations
By Fukushima Independent Commission,
Diet, Japan.
Given here is the excerpt of the National
Diet Of Japan’s Fukushima Nuclear
Accident Independent Investigation
Commission’s Report released in
October 2012. The complete report may
be accessed by going to
da.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/3856371/
naiic.go.jp/en/index.html
Conclusions
After a six-month investigation, the
National Diet Of Japan’s Fukushima
NuclearAccident Independent Investigation
Commission has concluded the following:
In order to prevent future disasters,
fundamental reforms must take place.
These reforms must cover both the
structure of the electric power industry
and the structure of the related government
and regulatory agencies as well as the
operation processes. They must cover
both normal and emergency situations.
The Root Cause
We believe that the root causes were
the organizational and regulatory systems
that supported faulty rationales for
decisions and actions, rather than issues
relating to the competency of any specific
individual. (see Recommendation 1).
Earthquake damage
We conclude that TEPCO was too
quick to cite the tsunami as the cause
of the nuclear accident and deny that
the earthquake caused any damage. We
believe there is a possibility that the
earthquake damaged equipment necessary
for ensuring safety, and that there is also
a possibility that a small-scale LOCA
occurred in Unit 1. We hope these points
will be examined further by a third party.
(see Recommendation 7).
Evaluation of operational problems
The Commission concludes that there
were organizational problems within
TEPCO. Had there been a higher level
of knowledge, training, and equipment
inspection related to severe accidents, and
had there been specific instructions given
to the on-site workers concerning the
state of emergency within the necessary
time frame, a more effective accident
response would have been possible. (see
Recommendation 4).
Emergency response issues
The Commission concludes that
the situation continued to deteriorate
because the crisis management system
of the Kantei, the regulators and other
responsible agencies did not function
correctly. The boundaries defining the
roles and responsibilities of the parties
involved were problematic, due to their
ambiguity. (see Recommendation 2).
Evacuation issues
The Commission concludes that the
residents’ confusion over the evacuation
stemmed from the regulators’ negligence
and failure over the years to implement
adequate measures against a nuclear
disaster, as well as a lack of action by
previous governments and regulators
focused on crisis management. The
crisis management system that existed
for the Kantei and the regulators should
protect the health and safety of the
public, but it failed in this function. (see
Recommendation 2).
Continuing public health and
welfare issues
The Commission recognizes that
the residents in the affected area are still
struggling from the effects of the accident.
They continue to face grave concerns,
including the health effects of radiation
exposure, displacement, the dissolution
of families, disruption of their lives and
lifestyles and the contamination of vast
areas of the environment. There is no
foreseeable end to the decontamination
and restoration activities that are
essential for rebuilding communities.
The Commission concludes that the
government and the regulators are not fully
committed to protecting public health and
safety; that they have not acted to protect
the health of the residents and to restore
their welfare. (see Recommendation 3).
Reforming the regulators
The Commission has concluded that
the safety of nuclear energy in Japan
and the public cannot be assured unless
the regulators go through an essential
transformation process. The entire
organization needs to be transformed, not
as a formality but in a substantial way.
Japan’s regulators need to shed the insular
attitude of ignoring international safety
standards and transform themselves
into a globally trusted entity. (see
Recommendation 5).
Reforming the operator
TEPCO did not fulfill its
responsibilities as a private corporation,
instead obeying and relying upon the
government bureaucracy of METI, the
government agency driving nuclear
policy. At the same time, through the
auspices of the Federation of Electric
Power Companies (FEPC), it manipulated
the cozy relationship with the regulators
to take the teeth out of regulations. (see
Recommendation 4).
Reforming laws and regulations
The Commission concludes that it
is necessary to realign existing laws and
regulations concerning nuclear energy.
Mechanismsmust be established to ensure
that the latest technological findings
from international sources are reflected
in all existing laws and regulations. (see
Recommendation 6).
Cosmetic solutions
Replacing people or changing the
names of institutions will not solve the
problems. Unless these root causes are
resolved, preventive measures against
future similar accidents will never be
complete. (see Recommendations 4, 5
and 6).
Recommendations
Recommendation 1:
Monitoring of the nuclear regulatory
body by the National Diet.
A permanent committee to deal with
issues regarding nuclear power must be
established in the National Diet in order
to supervise the regulators to secure the
safety of the public. Its responsibilities
should be:
1. To conduct regular investigations
and explanatory hearings of
Nuclear Plant Journal, January-February 2013
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Fukushima Daiichi Unit 4
