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We have access to the same system and
the same plant information that the NRC
has access to.
3.
What role does NEI have to play in
the above described efforts?
NEI has a large role, as they worked
with theNRC in developing the equipment
specifications, the requirements for the
FLEX that was then proposed to the NRC
and accepted by the NRC for installation.
We’ve worked hard to clearly define the
things that NEI does, the things that EPRI
does, the things that INPO does. NEI is
responsible for developing our regulatory
positions on things that we, as an industry,
intend to do in response to regulation
and so that we are consistent and we’re
responding to the regulation, to meet the
regulation very robustly. NEI does that
and gets agreement with the NRC. Then,
INPO evaluates to that guidance to make
sure that not only have we agreed to the
NRC, but we’re implementing it at the
site in accordance with the guidance.
EPRI provides the technical assurance
to NEI that what we are proposing to the
NRC has a sound technical basis.
The three groups, work very closely
together via the steering committee to
make sure that what we’ve proposed to
the NRC is technically sound. NEI works
to get agreement with the NRC on that.
And then we work with the sites to make
sure it gets implemented.
4.
When I saw the Fukushima site and
also Kashiwazaki site, they have the
emergency response centers which are
seismically qualified buildings. What is
the practice in the United States?
The industry typically has a technical
support center on the plant site that’s
providing direct technical support for the
plant, and then we have an emergency
operations facility that typically is
removed, and there’s very stringent
regulations in terms of the construction
of those facilities and the air filtration
associated with those facilities so that
they can be sustained during a particular
event.
5.
Did the US feel more comfortable
with a redundant system, two of them,
rather than having one seismically
qualified building?
We did, and we looked at that
quite a bit, and part of one of the key
recommendation that we have in the
INPO event report. So, we did an INPO
event report in Japan on that event, and
so we do have a recommendation that
you need to ensure your emergency
response facilities can be sustained
through any particular event that we’re
considering, and that will include being
able to move the command and control to
the emergency operations facility if we
need to move it out, and it would, also,
be supported by the industry through the
INPO industry response center.
6.
Is the INPO model being replicated
through Tokyo center, through Paris
center and through other WANO centers?
The specifics of what we talked
about, emergency response, is being done
a little differently wherever we go, but I
will say that at INPO, our number one
international strategy is to support and
do those things to help WANO. So the
first thing that we do is to make sure that
the WANO Atlanta center, which has a
very strong INPO influence, is the model
regional center. We want to implement all
the WANO program guides and program
requirements absolutely in an exemplary
fashion.
WearenowdoingWANOassessments
in addition to INPO assessments for peer
reviews. We’re developing the programs
that they have to identify plants that
need special industry assistance. We’ve
had that in INPO for a while, but we’re
expanding that to include more of an
international level of engagement there
as well. And so, we want the WANO
Atlanta center to be viewed as the place
that other centers come and benchmark
and model. Furthermore, some of the
programs that WANO is beginning to
implement at the other centers in Tokyo,
Moscow and Paris and Hong Kong are
things that we’ve done at INPO. And
so, we’ve done things with employees
at the Tokyo center or to the Paris center
to help them implement specific WANO
programs that are modeled after the
INPO programs, so that we help the other
centers move forward as well.
7.
Are there any regulations which
make sure that the control room has a
minimum ot two operators or more than
two operators at all times?
I’ll speak for the United States
because that’s really an area I’m familiar
with, but there are very strong regulations
that there is always an operator, we call it
at-the-controls area.
There is say a specifically designated
part of the plant in the control room,
where, there always needs to be an
operator who’s monitoring the control
panels, and that operator needs to be fit for
duty, needs to comply with a fatigue rule,
so that he’s not or she’s not tired, and then
there’s part of the behavioral observation
program, so that if there’s any aberrant
behavior, that would be identified by the
supervision or by the peers of that person.
So, we have very strong rules about the
continuous staffing of multiple people
in the control room, with one person
specifically responsible to be in the at-
the-controls area monitoring the control
boards. And so, that’s embedded in the
regulation. It’s something we at INPO
look at all the time, in terms of clarity
of who’s at the controls and what is the
minimum required staffing to be in the
control room at any one time. So in
my view, it’s so heavily regulated and
so closely watched by INPO and by the
station management, I couldn’t imagine
people leaving the control room in the
US. I can’t speak for other countries, but
I can speak very assuredly for the United
States.
8.
Concluding comments.
We are finding WANO a
tremendously effective organization to
really help us understand international
standards that are out there. We have done
a lot of benchmarking through WANO
and have really learned a lot. A lot of our
Fukushima response has been strongly
influenced by benchmarking done
through WANO in Western Europe and
in Asia. And we find those engagements
quite effective. And we sponsored three
Fukushima forums, where there’s been
a representative from every country that
belongs to WANO. It comes together
once a year and just describes what
they’re doing in that country. And it has
really influenced our response here in the
United States, and we’re very grateful for
the connections and the information we
get from WANO.
Contact: Ronn Smith, Institute
of Nuclear Power Operations, 700
Galleria Parkway, SE, Atlanta, GA,
30339; telephone: (404)290-3981, email:
.
