Page 46 - July-August 2012
Basic HTML Version
Contribution
to the Post
Fukushima
Efforts
By Judy Sneeden, GE Hitachi Nuclear
Energy.
Judy Sneeden
Judy Sneeden is the Commercialization
Leader for the GE Hitachi Nuclear
Energy Safety
Enhancement
Services business
and is currently
acting General
Manager. She has
been with GE for
23 years, 8 of them
in the company’s
nuclear business.
Her diverse
experiences
include leadership
roles within the
GEH Nuclear
Services business,
Global Nuclear Fuels Americas, and
GE Aviation including product line
management, new product introduction,
business integration, quality, and
inventory control. She is Six Sigma and
Lean certified with a Bachelor of Science
from UNC-Wilmington.
An Interview by Newal Agnihotri, Editor
of Nuclear Plant Journal at the Nuclear
Energy Assembly in Charlotte, North
Carolina, on May 23, 2012.
There was an initial discussion on
the 3 USNRC orders for clarification.
The following dialogue belongs with that
discussion versus a specific question.
One order EA-12-049 is Mitigating
Strategy for Beyond Design Basis Event.
What the industry has brought forth as
a solution to that is the FLEX program.
This order has three phases:
There’s an initial phase where the
utility has to use whatever they have
installed to maintain their coping time/
cooling functionality. The transition
phase is where the utility can use whatever
portable equipment they may have onsite.
The final phase is more of a long term
– possibly 72 hours after any beyond
design basis event
where they bring in
off-site resources.
One concept for
the final phase is
to have regional
depots across the
US. These would be
strategically placed
such that equipment
can service multiple
utilities.
The
second
order, EA-12-050
Reliable Hardened
Containment Vents
is initially focusing
on Mark 1 and Mark 2 containments.
The third order, EA-12-051 Reliable
Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation is
focusing on water level in the Spent Fuel
Pool.
Then the NRC issued a 50-54
(Request for Information Pursuant to Title
10 of the Code Of Federal Regulations
50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations
2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task
Force Review of Insights From the
Fukushima Dai-Ichi Accident) request
for information on seismic and flooding.
These are the first two external events that
the NRC is focusing on. There will be
others that follow – tornado, wind, hail,
ice, and things of that nature, but right
now they’re focusing on seismic and
flooding. The NRC is asking each utility
to perform a walk down on flooding and
a separate walk down with a focus on
seismic. The utility does its walk downs,
ascertains any vulnerabilities it may have
with respect to its design basis, and then
submits that information to the NRC.
Then, based on results of that assessment,
the utility may be required to do a margin
analysis or a probabilistic risk analysis.
Guidance is still to come from the NRC
on that.
1.
How has GE Hitachi Nuclear (GEH)
supported the utilities in response to the
three US NRC orders of March the 12th
2012?
GEH has developed a portfolio of
hardware, software, and design solutions
that align to the three NRC orders. In
addition, we have personnel with the
required critical skill-sets to support our
customers in response to the Request
for Information (50.54(f)) on seismic
and flooding. Aside from generating a
portfolio of solutions, we have had on-
going Safety Enhancement discussion
with our customers across the globe;
helping them to assess their current design
basis to their regulatory requirements.
2.
How have the utilities in the United
States handled the “Stress Tests” similar
to those that were done in Europe and
other countries?
Across the globe, each utility is
doing a stress test based on requirements
defined by a regulator or, for the US, the
Institute of Nuclear Power Operation
(INPO). Internationally, the stress test
consisted of defining “cliff edges.” Some
questions to answer are: when is it that
you experience cooling issues and when
is it that you experience core dislocations?
In the US, that was defined by INPO (IER
11-4). Also if you had more than one
unit at the site, you had to assume that
they all experienced the event at the same
time. So it wasn’t defining “cliff edges,”
it was defining when you have fallen off
the cliff, you have no AC power, no DC
power, and you can’t take credit for your
B5B equipment, unless it’s seismically
qualified. The utilities did commit to,
based on what their vulnerabilities were,
to purchase portable equipment and
to implementing changes at their site,
specific to their needs, by the end of
March 2012.
3.
How is GE Hitachi Nuclear helping
its clients meet the US NRC’s post-
Fukushima requirements?
46
Nuclear Plant Journal, July-August 2012
