Page 26 - July-August 2012
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A Lot of
Work
Ahead
By Vladimir Asmolov, Rosenergoatom.
Vladimir Asmolov
Vladimir Asmolov graduated in 1970
from Moscow Power Engineering
Institute, with specialization in
"Thermal Physics”. In April 2006 he
was appointed First Deputy General
Director - Director for Science and
Technology Policy, JSC “Concern
Rosenergoatom”.
He is the Chairman
of the Scientific and
Technical Council
(STC) #1 of the
State Corporation
“Rosatom”, the
Chairman of the
Scientific and
Technical Council
“Rosenergoatom”,
the Chief Editor
of the journal
“Rosenergoatom”.
He is also a
member of the
editorial board
of the journals
“Thermal physics of High Temperature”
and “Nuclear Engineering & Design”.
He is a member of the dissertation
councils STC “Kurchatov Institute”,
Moscow Power Engineering Institute
and a board member of the Nuclear
Society of Russia.
In 1997 he won the Order of Valor for
the participation in the liquidation of the
consequences of the Chernobyl accident.
In 1999 he won- The sign “Veteran of
nuclear energy and industry.”
This article is based on concluding
comments by Vladimir Asmolov,
the event moderator, at the Special
WANO Session at the Atomexpo 2012
Conference in Moscow, Russia on June
4, 2012 . A Q&A by Newal Agnihotri,
editor Nuclear Plant Journal at
Atomexpo in Moscow on June 5, 2012
follows the article.
We have discussed the world’s
situation after the Fukushima Daiichi
accident not only in the eyes of the
operators but from the designer and
regulator points of view. As concerns me
personally, the question that was raised
on the 11th of March, 2011 as a result of
the accidents in the Fukushima four units.
It was about the future of the nuclear
power. It has an absolutely clear answer
– yes, and those fourteen months after the
accident have proven that.
The nuclear power did not stop its
movement; it missed a blow like a boxer
but it was not knocked down – it swayed
and went on moving. This opinion was
proven by our discussions during today’s
event.
What were we talking about today?
First, we talked
about the absolute
responsibility
of
the operator for
the nuclear plant
safety, about the
requirement towards
the
operating
organization to be
permanently ready
for any accident and
be guided by the
main
defense-in-
depth principles, i.e.
accident prevention
and management,
which,
as
was
demonstrated by the
Fukushima accident,
are of equal priority.
Secondly, there were people thinking
that it is a designer who develops
a nuclear power plant, and it is an
operating organization who operates
it. Life shows that it is not true. The
features of each new power unit must
meet the operator’s request being based
on the operator’s operational experience
and knowledge. This is dictated by the
operating organization’s responsibility.
Continuous improvement of the plant
safety design features on the basis of
new knowledge and on the basis of the
operational experience is a fundamental
and paramount everyday challenge to the
operating organization.
It cannot be tolerated that nothing is
being done during the 30-year operation
of the plant and that it is supposed that
people of the mid-60s foresaw all the
possibilities in the design in order to
provide the safety. In 1971 the designer of
Fukushima, i.e. General Electric, handed
over their responsibility to the operator.
And this responsibility should have rested
with the operator during all the period of
the plant operation.
Thirdly, today we were discussing
one more important issue, an issue of
the lessons to be learnt by the operating
organization, which is a paramount
task. This is not just the accident-related
lessons, which is obligatory. This means
the dissemination of the best practices the
operators demonstrate; the continuous
analysis of the on-site situation; the
publication of the internal reports to
review the emergency events. These
assessments should be absolutely open,
and the knowledge should be disseminated
among all the involved stakeholders and
the public. This is a prerequisite for the
existence of the nuclear power.
Then, I fully agree with Yukka
Laaksonen who said that the self-
complacency is perhaps the worst thing.
Today it was said we had resolved the
hydrogen explosion problem by installing
passive recombiners.
We could say: it is good that we did
it; but we could also say in case of high
hydrogen concentrations the hydrogen
safety system would not operate and this
is absolutely clear from the results of the
performed experiments. Resolution of
the above issue requires immediate joint
efforts of all the concerned specialists from
both the operators and the regulators.
During twenty five years we were
investigating a probability of the steam
explosion. .On one hand, we could say
it is very good that we have an answer:
according to the experiments at FARO
and CROTOS test facilities one steam
explosion is probable per one thousand
core meltdowns. But I do not know
whether it is good or not, and there is no
answer to this question so far. It means
that those activities being under way
today in the framework of the new steam-
explosion programmes are extremely
important and necessary, too.
At last, with regard to the
containment filtration No
ё
l Camarcat
from EDF informed us that all the French
plants are equipped with the filtration
facilities. But Rolf Janke from AREVA
showed in his presentation that these
filtration facilities have no elementary or
26
Nuclear Plant Journal, July-August 2012
